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13 Commitment shall issue FORTHWITH. / 
DATED this . day of r j j jgr »19 ? i 
COPIES TO COUITSEL 
• ' , / • / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
TIMOTHY R. EA2TS0N 
Defense Counsel 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondant, 
vs. 
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 910118 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a final judgment and conviction against James 
Douglas Tyler for one count of Aggravated Arson, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). The appellant was found guilty by a 
jury on November 29, 1990, in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, Judge, presiding. The final judgment and conviction were 
rendered on January 7, 1991, whereby Mr. Tyler was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of 5 years to life at the Utah State Prison. 
MANNY GARCIA 
431 South 300 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARION DECKER 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 
Attorney for Respondant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
POINT I 4 
CONCLUSION 11 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases cited 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F 2d at 133-134. 
6 
Hollaway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 479 (1977) 7 
State v. Humphries, 818 P2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991) 6 
State v. Johnson 176 Utah. Adv. R. 17. Utah. C. App 6 
State v. Templin, 805 P 2d 182 (Utah 1990) 2, 7, 11 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.; 2052, 80 L. Ed. 
2d 674 (1984) 2, 7, 8, 11, 12 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, 
(1953 as amended) 1 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 2, Section 2(3)(i), 
(1953 as amended) 2 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondant, 
vs. 
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 910118 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3 )(i), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), whereby the 
defendant in a criminal action may take an appeal to the Supreme 
Court from a final judgment of the District Court involving a 
conviction of a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Were counsel for appellant ineffective in representing 
him to the extent that it was tantamount to actual and constructive 
denial of counsel? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of those statutes and constitutional provisions that 
do not appear in the body of the brief are included in Appendix A. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is usually a mixed 
question of law and fact. See State v. Templin, 805 P 2d 182 (Utah 
1990), (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Questions of law can be 
independently reviewed. (See Templin at 187). Questions of fact 
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (see id.) 
The Strickland standard of review applies, wherein appellant 
must show that counsel' s performance was deficient and that the 
deficiency prejudiced the appellant (See Templin at 186). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against James 
Douglas Tyler for one count of aggravated arson, a first degree 
felony, in violation of §76-6-103 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). A jury found Mr. Tyler guilty as charged in the 
information on November 29, 1990, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Timothy R Hanson, Judge, presiding. The final judgment and 
conviction were rendered on January 7, 1991 whereby Mr. Tyler was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of 5 years to life at the Utah 
State Prison. 
Appellant's trial counsel withdrew after filing the notice of 
appeal in this case, citing a conflict of interest based on 
appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. New 
counsel was appointed to prepare and submit appellant's appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 1, 1990, police officers were called by Ms. Kathy 
Tyler to 525 East 800 South in Salt Lake City. The police spoke 
with Ms. Tyler, a resident of the house located there, whom they 
located next door at her neighborsfs house. They also detained Mr. 
Tyler, the appellant, who was located nearby. (See Nov. 28 R. p. 
94) Ms. Tyler entered her home after talking to the police. 
Shortly thereafter, there was a fire discovered burning in the 
kitchen area. The police called the fire department. Appellant 
was brought from an area in the rear of the house to the front. 
Some keys and Ms. Tyler's identification card were taken from him 
(R.102) and then he was arrested. The fire burned for about 5 
minutes from the time it was discovered until the fire department 
put it out (R.109). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Counsel for appellant was ineffective in their representation 
of appellant to the extent that appellant's entire defense was 
compromised. His constitution right to effective assistance of 
counsel was denied him and subsequently he did not receive a fair 
trial. 
Appellant charges that not only was trial counsel ineffective, 
so too were the lawyers he had prior to the appointment of trial 
counsel. The attorney who conducted the preliminary hearing on 
August 16, 1990 had not spoken to appellant prior to that hearing. 
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The attorney originally assigned to the case spoke once with 
appellant on July 12, 1990. By the time trial counsel got the case 
the scene of the crime was cold and altered, and crucial evidence 
was no longer available. No one had investigated the case for 
appellant at all until October 15, 1990. Trial counsel could not 
adequately contest the States1 evidence nor present sufficient 
evidence of his own to corroborate appellant's account of the 
facts. No one interviewed witnesses in a timely manner, no experts 
were summoned to dispute the State's experts. Appellant was denied 
the opportunity to present a coherent, substantial defense. 
POINT I 
Counsel were ineffective in their representation of appellant 
in violation of his constitution guarantee to effective 
representation. Their ineffectiveness amounted to actual and 
constructive denial of counsel. 
INTRODUCTION 
The information against appellant was filed on July 5, 1990. 
Appellant was appointed counsel shortly thereafter. Nancy Bergeson 
(hereinafter Bergeson) Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, was 
assigned the case. She made an appearance and a request for 
Discovery on July 9, 1990 (See Appendix B: Appearance of Counsel 
and Motion for Discovery). The County Attorney responded to that 
motion on July 16, 1990. (See Appendix B: Response to Discovery). 
Bergeson met with appellant once on July 12, 1990. Ms. Bergeson 
apparently went on vacation from sometime after July 12 until early 
August 1990. Bergeson requested that John Wennergren, MSW, 
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interview appellant in the jail, and he prepared a memorandum for 
Bergeson on July 27, 1990. (See Appendix B: Memorandum) Bergeson 
filed a motion to withdraw based on an office conflict of interest 
with appellant on August 3, 1990 (See Appendix B: Motion to 
Withdraw). 
Appellant's preliminary hearing scheduled for August 2, 1990, 
was postponed because appellant had no attorney. The preliminary 
hearing was finally held on August 16, 1990. Ken Brown 
(hereinafter Brown) had been appointed to the case and he appeared 
on August 16. Appellant had never spoken to Brown prior to that 
hearing. The hearing culminated in a bindover to district court. 
Appellant's district court arraignment set for September 10, 
1990 was continued because appellant had no attorney. Brown had 
moved to withdraw because appellant had complained to the Utah 
State Bar about Brown. Appellant was finally arraigned on 
September 17, 1990. Stephen McCaughey (hereinafter McCaughey) 
appeared as counsel for appellant. Appellant had never met nor 
spoken to McCaughey prior to September 17. (See Sept 17 R. p. 3) 
Appellant was asked to enter a plea and he responded that he'd 
like to talk to a lawyer (Id p.4). The judge did not appreciate 
appellant's responses, but it was established that McCaughey would 
meet with appellant and discuss his case the next day. McCaughey 
met with appellant 2 days later, 79 days after the fire. 
No one investigated anything for appellant until October 15, 
31, 1990, when McCaughey had some investigation done. 
At appellants pre-trial conference on October 1, 1990, 
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McCaughey stated he was awaiting transcripts of the preliminary 
hearing and that he had been "planning to get down to talk with" 
appellant (See Oct. 1 R. p.3-4.) 
On October 17, 1990, McCaughey moved to continue the trial 
scheduled for October 18, because he and his investigator needed to 
" . . . check on some problem . . . with the fire investigation . 
. ." (now four months old). McCaughey did not know if the "scene 
" was still intact (see id). In fact, the "scene" had been 
repaired (See Nov. 29 R. P. 5) Appellant had been in jail 109 
days. Trial was set for November 28, 1990. 
ARGUMENT 
While ordinarily a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
must be addressed by collateral attack through habeas corpus 
proceedings, in limited circumstances the claim may be raised on 
direct appeal. State v. Johnson 176 Utah. Adv. R. 17. [Utah. C. 
App January 31, 1991 citing State v. Humphries, 818 P2d 1027, 1029 
(Utah 1991)]. Those circumstances exist when there is new counsel 
on appeal and there is an adequate trial record. (See Johnson, at 
18). That is the case here. This court may proceed to consider 
the merits of appellants claim. 
Although there are no fact findings as to the ineffectiveness 
of counsel here, the records of what actually transpired allows 
this court to determine on appeal, as a matter of law, whether 
counself s performance constituted ineffective counsel (See Johnson 
at 18, citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F 2d at 
6 
133-134. ) 
In Hollawav v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 479 (1977) the U.S. 
Supreme Court said that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel is "so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error." (cited in Johnson at 18) 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees an accused the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
In deciding ineffective assistance claims based on the federal 
constitution, this Court has relied on Strickland v. Washington 466 
U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed 2d 674 (USSC 1984) Strickland 
set out a two-part test: 
First, the appellant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient, meaning that errors were made so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as "counsel" guaranteed the appellant by the 
Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the appellant must show that the deficient performance 
prejudiced him, meaning counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive appellant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable. 466 U.S. at 687 (See also State v. Templin 805 P2d at 
186, Utah 1990). 
This Sixth Amendment right has been interpreted to mean 
"reasonable, effective assistance" (See id). Appellant carries the 
burden of meeting both parts of the test. (See id). Appellant must 
identify the "acts or omissions" which, under the circumstances, 
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness. Appellant must show there is a reasonable 
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probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the rest 
of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable 
probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome [See id 466 U.S. at 694; 805 p 2d at 187). 
This court should consider the totality of the evidence, 
whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an 
isolated effect, and how strongly the verdict is supported by the 
record (See id 466 US at 696;805 P 2d at 187) 
However, in Sixth Amendment claims based on actual denial of 
counsel, constructive denial of counsel or conflicts of interest, 
prejudice is presumed (emphasis added). Se id 466 U.S. at 692; 805 
P 2d 186 footnote 204). 
The Strickland court said: 
"Counsel can deprive a defendant of the right to effective 
assistance simply by failing to render adequate legal assistance." 
466 U.S. at 692 
Appellant contends that all the lawyers he had rendered such 
perfunctory assistance as to amount to actual denial of counsel in 
the case of Bergeson, and constructive denial in the case of Brown 
and McCaughey. Thus the prejudice prong of the Strickland test 
should be presumed here. Bergeson did nothing for the appellant 
while more than a month passed and the "scene" cooled. Then Brown 
appeared and conducted the preliminary hearing without the benefit 
of any preparation, investigation or contact with appellant. If 
the Circuit Court forced Brown to conduct the hearing that day, 
then the Court was a party to the constructive denial of counsel. 
Appellant insists those facts alone speak against reasonable, 
8 
effective assistance and representation• 
McCaughey appeared on September 17 and met with appellant 2 
days later. As of October 1, McCaughey had no other contact with 
appellant. He initiated an investigation on October 15, long after 
the "scene" had been repaired. His efforts were too little, too 
late, ineffective, and amounted to constructive denial of counsel. 
Appellant contends Bergeson was ineffective for not arranging 
to have the "scene" investigated. She was not "functioning" as the 
counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. It was actual denial 
of counsel during perhaps the most crucial time for discovery and 
consultation. The importance of immediate investigation in an 
arson case is obvious. The burn pattern, the point of origin, the 
presence or lack of accellerants, the possibility of other sources 
or causes of the fire, should be investigated by the defense at the 
scene, before it is cleaned up or repaired. Surely the state would 
be calling their arson investigator and "expert" to state his 
findings and opinions. No such investigation was conducted by the 
defense lawyers here. No one interviewed witnesses while the 
events were still fresh. No timely investigation was made of Ms. 
Tyler, the key witness. 
At trial there was contradictory testimony regarding whether 
Ms. Tyler had called the police to report a fire or a disturbance 
or both (Nov. 28R p. 99; 157-158; 185). There were tapes made of 
the calls to the police dispatcher that would have clarified that 
issue but the tape was erased before McCaughey subpoenaed it (Nov. 
29R p. 7) Since the State's own witness, Tennison, remembered Ms. 
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Tyler calling the police twice, once to report a fire, that tape 
became crucial to impeach Ms. Tyler and the police, corroborate 
appellant's testimony and support his theory that she may have 
started the fire and blamed him. The fire was small. It took the 
fire department 2 minutes to put it out. It burned for 5 minutes 
total. Ms. Tyler had a fire at her home two months prior and 
blamed appellant then too. She testified to having called the 
police on appellant once or twice when in fact she had called more 
that six times. It was not brought out that appellant was 
acquitted of previous false charges brought by her. 
Appellant contends Ms. Tyler fabricated evidence 10 days after 
the fire (Nov 28 R p. 137-138;91-92) An investigation of those 
materials may have discredited Ms. Tyler. By the time McCaughey 
investigated, the evidence was gone. 
There were fingerprints on the container that the state 
theorized contained the accelerant used in the fire. While they 
weren't appellants fingerprints (Nov. 28 R. P. 124) no effort was 
made to see if they were Ms. Tyler's or even if that particular 
accelerant was used. 
Appellant had no trace of accelerant's about him upon his 
arrest, which seems unlikely if he poured liquids over various 
parts of the house after having been hit with a baseball bat hard 
enough that Ms. Tyler said she thought she had broken his ribs. 
(Nov. 28 R P. 169) 
Appellants did not see any police reports or other discovery 
before his preliminary hearing. No one investigated his facts. 
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Bergeson failed to "function" as effective counsel during a 
most crucial phase and barely functioned at all as far as legal 
assistance to appellant. Brown was ill-prepared, "winged" the 
preliminary hearing, and then withdrew. McCaughey came too late, 
and his investigation was not timely and fruitless. This 
cumulative lack of reasonable effective representation prejudiced 
appellant. Insufficient defense was offered at his trial, and he 
did not have meaningful advice and assistance of counsel through 
critical stages of the proceedings. 
Appellant contends he has shown that but for counsel's 
deficient performance, the results of the proceedings would have 
been different. This conviction is suspect. In view of the 
totality of circumstance appellant was denied reasonable effective 
representation. As the court said in Templin: 
"If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying 
facts of a case . . . counself s performance cannot fall within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance 805 p2d at 188. ) 
Therefore, because counsel did not timely nor adequately 
investigate the underlying facts here, the first part of the 
Strickland test is met. (See id). 
The second part of the test, prejudice, is presumed due to the 
showing of actual and constructive denial of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant asks the Court to find he 
was denied reasonable effective assistance of counsel. Appellant 
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has identified acts and omissions of counsel that fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Appellant has met the 
Strickland test. 
Appellant asks this court to reverse his conviction and remand 
this case back to the district court for a new trial. 
/ dav of '-< Dated this y  7 -^-^^U^SL^L^ 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MANNY GARCIA, 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 7 day of 
February 1992. 
^ < (&iLc+ - — 
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APPENDIX A 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI. [Rights of the accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the 
State and the district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
APPENDIX B 
NANCY BERGESON, #303 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 901007323FS 
NANCY BERGESON, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, on 
appointment of the above-entitled court, herewith enters an 
Appearance of Counsel of record for the above-named defendant. 
DATED this ^flK day of July, 1990. 
NANCY BE 
Attorney/'at Law 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of July, 1990. 
NANCY BERGESONf #303 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER, 
Defendant. 
FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Case No. 901007323FS 
JUDGE MAURICE D. JONES 
COMES NOW the defendant, JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER, through his 
attorney, NANCY BERGESON, and requests the following material be 
provided to him as discovery no later than three days prior to the 
calendar call presently set for the 12th day of July, 1990. 
To-wit: 
1. All police reports and investigations concerning the 
above-entitled case; 
2. All recorded statements of the defendant and 
co-defendant(s), if any; 
3. The criminal record of the defendant or felony 
convictions of any witnesses to be called by the prosecution; 
4. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
defendant; 
5. All evidence tending to mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant; 
6. All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; 
7. All physical evidence taken and all investigative 
analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case. 
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5)(b), the State 
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead, 
DATED this y/'L-.day of July, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NANCY BERGESON ~JT~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this day of July, 1990. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
MARTIN VERHOEF Bar No. 3326 
Deputy County Attorneys 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES DOUGLAS TYLER, 
Defendant. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY 
Case No. 90107323FS 
Honorable 
Your general request for discovery cannot be honored 
pursuant to State v. Kniaht 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). Please find 
enclosed copies of pertinent documents reflecting only what is 
contained in the prosecution file. Other documents may or may not 
exist in individual police agency files and you are directed to 
contact these agencies for such information. 
The Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney will strictly comply 
with the mandates of Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
DATED this 16th day of July, 1?30. 
DAVID E- YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
MARTIN VERHOEF v 
Deputy County Attorney 
MEMORANDUM 
DATE: July 27, 1990 
TO: Nancy Bergeson 
FROM: John Wennergren 
RE: James Tyler 
I interviewed Mr. Tyler in the Salt Lake County Jail on 
July 26, 1990. He is an extremely angry person who demonstrates 
his hostility readily. He was extremely upset that his attorney 
was on vacation while "he was sitting around in the jail." 
Mr. Tyler engaged in coherent and logical conversations during 
our interview and did not demonstrate any signs of a psychosis, a 
bipolar disorder, or any other serious mental illness. I suspect 
Mr. Tyler is an extremely inadequate individual who has learned 
to control and influence people around him by the use of his 
anger. I suspect he would be diagnosed as a personality 
disorder, perhaps an antisocial personality disorder. He tends 
to minimize his own involvement in the incident and takes a great 
deal of delight in blaming basically everything thing that's 
happened to him on his ex-wife. It is instructive to note that 
he was divorced from the victim approximately 1 1/2 years after 
their marriage. They were married in 1983. Despite this fact he 
continues to live off and on with her even though he lists a long 
series of incidents in which she has done him wrong. Mr. Tyler 
provided me with the attached list of demands which consists of 
information he feels we should be checking out in order to prove 
his wife is lying. He seems to feel this information will 
vindicate him. 
Mr. Tyler basically seems to be a somewhat hystronic 
individual who seems to have adapted to living a "crisis" 
lifestyle. 
JW:sh 
p.s. This is the same client that Bob Steele had the altercation 
with in his office where he attempted to throw a chair at him. 
We conflicted his misdemeanor case out of the office to Joe 
Fratto because Mr. Tyler was trying to file attempted homicide 
charges against Bob. You will probably want to speak to Bob 
about this and also see if John Hill wants us to conflict this 
case out as well. 
Sheri 
NANCY BERGESON (#0303) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East Fifth South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES TYLER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS 
COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. 901007323FS 
F. JOHN HILL, Director of Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, and NANCY BERGESON, attorney for defendant, hereby move 
this Court for an Order allowing the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association to withdraw as court appointed counsel in the above 
entitled matter on the grounds that a conflict of interest presently 
exists between this defendant and the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association. It is further requested that KENNETH BROWN and RANDALL 
COX be appointed to represent the defendant in all future 
proceedings. 
DATED this "?_ day of AUGUST, 1990. 
s.<2*~~ 
JOHN HILL, Director 
'alt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. Attorney for Defendant 
TYLER, JAMES DOUGLAS F90-1690 
Agg.Arson 1° 90 1007 323FJ 
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Date Time 
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